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Defense of Tests Prevents Objective Consideration of Validity and Fairness

Janet E. Helms Boston College
In defending tests of cognitive abilities, knowledge, or skills (CAKS) from the skepticism of their "family members, friends, and neighbors" and aiding psychologists forced to defend tests from "myth and hearsay" in their own skeptical social networks (p. 215), Sackett, Borneman, and Connelly (May-June 2008) focused on evaluating validity coefficients, racial or gender group differences, and fair assessment research. In doing so, they concluded that CAKS tests generally yield valid and fair test scores for their intended purposes, but because the authors did not adequately attend to (a) research design issues (e.g., inclusion of independent or predictor variables [IPV] and dependent variables or criteria), (b) statistical assumptions underlying interpretation of their analyses (e.g., bivariate normality of distributions of test scores and criteria), and (c) conceptual concerns (e.g., whether racial categories should be used as explanatory constructs), alternative conclusions about CAKS test score validity and fairness are plausible. Although all of the foregoing areas of concern are germane to each of the assertions addressed by Sackett et al. (2008) Whereas correlations between test scores and criteria (i.e., validity coefficients) might be corrected for range restriction, measurement error, or whatever one can make a reasonable argument for correcting, Sackett et al. (2008) provided no rationale for correcting the numbers of SDs separating two groups' CAKS test scores. In fact, Grissom and Kim (2001) argued that the correction for two groups' SDs is to determine a priori whether the SDs are homogeneous, whether they should be collapsed across groups to form the denominator of the d statistic and, therefore, make d values interpretable.
2. Racial/ethnic groups serve in the role of IPVs, a role that ordinarily is reserved for measures or manipulations of explanatory constructs, and CAKS test scores function in the role of dependent variables or criteria when d values are used to describe between-group racial/ethnic differences. In Sackett et al.'s (2008) analyses of validity coefficients, CAKS test scores served as measures of explanatory constructs (arguably, CAKS) for the selected CAKS criteria (e.g., grade point average). Yet the authors' conclusion that racial groups' d values reflected differences in "developed abilities" (p. 222) (a) treated the dependent variable (i.e., test scores) as explanatory and (b) therefore camouflaged the fact that the IPV in their FA research design was racial groups, a nominal variable with no conceptual meaning (Helms, Jernigan, & Mascher, 2005 These findings indicate that higher numbers of Whites relative to Blacks in samples were related to larger mean differences favoring Whites or disfavoring Blacks. They also indicate that the RGS correlations for both the numerator of the d statistic (i.e., mean differences) and the denominator (i.e., aggregated SDs) were equivalent to about 1 SD of test score variation; in fact, conversion of the latter RGS-SD correlation to d resulted in the same value as calculating d by regular procedures (i.e., d ϭ 0.99) and suggests that the average mean CAKS score differences and skewness levels across studies were interchangeable. In sum, when unequal or skewed racial groups are not corrected in the source studies used in meta-analyses, then the larger numbers of White relative to Black test takers provide an alternative explanation for what has been construed as a conceptually meaningful 1-SD White-Black CAKS mean score difference. The atheoretical nature of racial groups makes it problematic that Sackett et al. (2008) interpreted the racial groups inherent in d values as reflective of something more than mere relative frequency counts.
Explanation or removal of the variation in test scores ostensibly attributable to racial groups requires measurement of the types of constructs for which such groups serve as unacknowledged proxies (Helms, 2006; Helms et al., 2005) . Most experts in race and cultural psychology, many of whom are cited in the Guidelines on Multicultural Education, Training, Research, Practice, and Organizational Change (APA, 2003) , recognize that people (as opposed to tests) have measurable racial/cultural characteristics that interact with their responses to CAKS tests. Sackett et al. (2008) Helms (2006) showed that racial variables, such as racial identity schemas (i.e., self-perceptions derived from ascribed racial-group membership) can account for the equivalent of at least 1 SD in individual Black test takers' CAKS test scores, albeit by unknown mechanisms (pp. 851-852). Sackett et al. (2008) seemingly agreed that correlations between racial identity and test scores would indicate that tests assess construct-irrelevant variance but opined that "the dominant view in the testing field rejects the position that a finding of a relationship between race (or, in Helms's model, a race-related variable) and test scores can be directly interpreted as signaling bias or unfairness" (p. 223) because racial identity might also be associated with "investing less time in one's studies" (p. 223), which the authors interpreted as construct-relevant variance (i.e., CAKS). Yet if study time is also correlated with CAKS test scores, then it is another source of construct-irrelevant variance that contributes to unfairness (AERA et al., 1999) . Also, when researchers directly interpret racial groups, which are not measurable, as if they are IPVs, they are engaging in unfair assessment, a problem that can be overcome by replacing racial-group frequency counts with "race-related" IPVs, such as ST or racial identity, which can be measured. This type of paradigm shift in FA research is long past due.
